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John Gray has long criticized contemporary liberal theorists for what he 
takes to be their ignorance of the history of the liberal tradition. In his 
own work, he presents liberalism as having two contrasting faces: today’s 
dominant Enlightenment liberalism and an older, wrongly neglected, mo-
dus vivendi liberalism. Enlightenment liberalism is identified with the 
project of specifying the universal scope of and limits to governmental 
authority. It aims to secure a single political regime valid for all rational 
people by transforming traditional forms of morality through the applica-
tion of critical reason.  
 In his most recent work, Gray has located his objections to liberalism 
as part of a larger assault upon humanism. Against the belief that human-
ism follows from naturalism, Gray argues that the two positions are anti-
thetical. A consistent naturalism rules out the utopianism of the Enlight-
enment project by acknowledging our imperfect condition. More posi-
tively, it means recognizing value pluralism in political life. Value plu-
ralism entails that human diversity is not something that reason might 
show to rest upon a mistake but is an inescapable consequence of the free 
exercise of that reason.  
 Gray proposes that we should give up on Enlightenment liberalism 
and instead join Hobbes in seeing the task of politics to be to secure 
peaceful coexistence between different ways of life. His Hobbesian posi-
tion is said to be wholly naturalistic in giving up any idea of human per-
fection, rejecting both the requirement that citizens participate in the 
Enlightenment task of rationally transforming themselves and the related 
hope that they might coexist within a single liberal regime. “It is,” he 
writes in Two Faces of Liberalism, “better to step back from Kant to 
Hobbes, and think of the liberal project as the pursuit of modus vivendi 
among conflicting values.”1 Gray thinks of the attempt to secure a modus 
vivendi as a second face of liberalism, one that holds that different politi-
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cal settlements are appropriate in different times and places.  
 This paper argues that in developing his own position, Gray does 
more than simply “step back” to Hobbes; rather, he reformulates Hobbes’s 
arguments by adding to them elements of Enlightenment liberalism that 
he claims to reject. Gray is committed to the view that in accepting our 
situation as part of the natural world we should embrace what he calls the 
truth of value pluralism and recognize that any legitimate political set-
tlement must acknowledge a “universal minimum content of morality.” 
Contrary to his assertions, these claims tacitly retain the two elements—
the transformative and the universalistic—that are central to the Enlight-
enment liberalism and render it problematic. The paper concludes by 
suggesting that Gray is torn between rejecting that face of liberalism and 
offering his own value-pluralist version of it because of a misplaced con-
cern with moral relativism. 
 
 
Gray as Consistent Anti-Utopian 
 
Gray has intrigued and infuriated his many critics by providing a fa-
mously moving target.2 But despite attracting criticism for his apparently 
ever-shifting position, a single theme runs through his writings. This is 
his antagonism to what he regards as utopian political projects and the 
assumptions about human nature upon which they are built. Such pro-
jects, notably Marxism, regard politics as the means to achieve a single 
human good. They are said by Gray to ignore the contingency and par-
ticularity of historical circumstances, a neglect that inevitably leads to 
disaster. As he remarks, “All societies contain divergent ideals of life. 
When a utopian regime collides with this fact the result can only be re-
pression or defeat. Utopianism does not cause totalitarianism … but to-
talitarianism follows whenever the dream of a life without conflict is 
consistently pursued through the use of state power.”3  
 For the early part of his intellectual life, Gray took liberalism to stand 
opposed to utopian political projects. But a significant moment came 
when he began to identify liberalism itself with utopianism. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, Gray was an advocate of neoliberalism, an ideol-
ogy articulated in the work of F.A. Hayek and embodied in the New 
Right. He supported neoliberalism as the only practicable response to 
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specific circumstances, namely, the failings of the British post-war con-
sensus and, more generally, the collapse of Soviet-style central planning.  
 Gray subsequently came to regard neoliberalism as self-defeating. 
This is because it destroyed the inherited conditions within which social 
life takes place by remaking them in terms of market relations. However, 
he was most interested not in the particular details of that defeat but 
rather in neoliberalism’s status as a form of utopianism. Neoliberalism is, 
he wrote, comparable to communist planning; it is “a managerialist Cul-
tural Revolution … a Maoism of the Right, … [a] permanent revolution 
of unfettered market processes.”4 Against it, he turned to conservatism, 
in particular the work of Michael Oakeshott. Gray is sympathetic to 
Oakeshott’s opposition to “rationalism in politics,” accepting his criti-
cism of Hayek that planning to avoid central planning is itself a form of 
the same style of (for Gray, utopian) politics. Yet Gray came to think that 
conservatism too is caught up in the same problems that beset neoliberal-
ism. The political success of neoliberalism meant that conservatism is no 
longer a possible response, since the very institutions and forms of life 
that conservatives had defended no longer exist. And in addition, Gray 
detected in Oakeshott a hint of the rationalism that he was so critical of 
in others. This is seen in his view that the modern state may, in the form 
of his preferred “civil association,” claim authority based solely on alle-
giance to formal principles rather than a shared cultural identity. For 
Gray, this takes Oakeshott in the direction of Kant and contemporary 
Kantian political theorists.5  
 For Gray, the virtue of writers such as Hayek and Oakeshott lies in 
their awareness of the dangers of utopianism, even if they ultimately suc-
cumb to some version of it. In this way, he thinks they should be distin-
guished from Kantian liberals such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. 
The utopianism of writers such as Rawls and Dworkin attracted the large 
part of Gray’s critical attention in his writings of the 1990s. These writ-
ers are wholeheartedly and for him unreflectively committed to the at-
tempt to identify a single, universally valid political regime. This is “the 
project of specifying universal limits to the authority of government and, 
by implication, to the scope of political life. The task of liberal theory 
was to specify the principles, and sometimes the institutions, in which 
this universal limitation on political power was expressed and embod-
ied.”6 Those who subscribe to this project are said to pay no attention to 
concrete circumstance, deploying instead “an unhistorical and abstract 
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individualism in the service of a legalist or jurisprudential paradigm of 
political philosophy.”7  
 Gray’s principal interest in such writers is that he sees them as the 
latest manifestation of a broader “Enlightenment project.” In his charac-
terization, the Enlightenment took its task to be to overcome traditional 
forms of knowledge. Pre-modern societies viewed the process of acquir-
ing knowledge to be a gradual one, building upon traditions that they 
valued as the storehouse for generations of wisdom. Enlightenment 
thinkers took it to be their mission to subject such received wisdom to 
the light of critical reason. They insisted upon a firm distinction between 
tradition and rationality, taking any knowledge that was not produced 
and validated by the methods of the new sciences to be primitive false-
hoods. Their project was in this way transformative, that of “refounding 
morality and society on universal, tradition-independent rational princi-
ples.”8  
 The thinkers of the Enlightenment belonged to a variety of intellec-
tual movements and wrote in very different contexts. For this reason, 
some have rejected the very idea of an Enlightenment project. Brian 
Barry, for instance, dismisses as a crude caricature the notion of an 
Enlightenment project that can “be captured in a few airy remarks about 
‘Reason’ and so on.”9 Gray is, however, aware of this objection. He ac-
knowledges the differences between Enlightenment writers, which con-
cern not only their different conceptions of reason but also issues such as 
how far they were committed to a notion of human progress and the dif-
ferent conceptions of a universal cosmopolitan society upon which they 
thought humanity would converge. However, he does not think these 
differences upset the idea of a single Enlightenment project. Thinkers 
such as Barry resemble, he argues, those revisionist Marxists who seek to 
show that Marx was not committed to economic determinism. In both 
cases, the argument is an apology that focuses on side issues and ob-
scures the central thrust of the position in question.10 For all the differ-
ences between Enlightenment figures, a significant number were com-
mitted to the project of constructing a universal civilization through the 
application of human reason. This project is, moreover, one that contin-
ues to inform current thinking: it is “the project that animated Marxism 
and liberalism in all their varieties, which underpins both the new liberal-
ism and neoconservatism, and to which every significant body of opinion 
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in the United States continues to subscribe.”11 
 Gray’s understanding of the Enlightenment is much indebted to the 
writings of Alasdair MacIntyre. He joins MacIntyre in thinking that the 
Enlightenment project was self-undermining: the very process of cease-
less rational disclosure came to apply to the Enlightenment itself by 
showing up the absence of foundations for its own values and practices, a 
phenomenon that he calls its “self-undermining effect.”12 And, like Mac-
Intyre, Gray maintains that the self-undermining nature of the Enlight-
enment impacts upon liberalism. For them both, the Enlightenment was 
not simply a project of philosophers but of liberal society as a whole, a 
society hostile to tradition and received sources of authority. Liberalism 
is itself a project, one every bit as revolutionary as Marxism. It takes 
over the Enlightenment concern to transform traditional moralities, and 
goes on to claim that rational beliefs are capable of being accommodated 
within a single political regime. 
 Gray departs from MacIntyre, however, because he considers the 
Enlightenment project part of a larger Christian tradition. Whereas Mac-
Intyre reacts to liberalism by calling for a form of Thomism, for Gray 
they are both aspects of the same thing: “the Enlightenment project of 
unifying all values under the aegis of a rational reconstruction of moral-
ity is merely a long shadow cast in the slow eclipse of Christian tran-
scendental faith.”13 His solution is not to return to Thomism or to any 
other ideal. Rather, he recommends that we accept our imperfect condi-
tion and adopt what Heidegger called “releasement,” whereby “we let 
things be rather than aiming wilfully to transform them or subject them 
to our purposes.”14 
 It is only in his most recent writings that Gray’s reasons for thinking 
all utopian projects necessarily doomed to failure have become clear. He 
has increasingly come to emphasize that all these projects share in the 
assumption (or “illusion,” as he has it)15 that humans can escape their 
animal condition. In works such as Straw Dogs and Black Mass, the fun-
damental division in contemporary life is said to be between humanism 
and naturalism. For Gray, naturalism is not the counterpart to humanism, 
but contradicts it. This is because humanism is just another version of the 
Christian belief that humans might secure salvation: for Christians by 
overcoming the Fall; for humanists by overcoming our animal nature. A 
consistent naturalism, in contrast, opposes any thought that humans 
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might transcend nature—for example, by employing our common reason 
in order to achieve a singularly rational politician regime. Gray claims 
that outside of natural science, the idea of progress is a myth. Any im-
provement in the human condition will be temporary, likely to be lost in 
a generation or two, and the costs of achieving it (as the case of the So-
viet Union demonstrated) intolerably high.  
 In giving up on the idea of progressive political projects, and more 
generally on the idea of moral progress, Gray has been thought by some 
to be a nihilist.16 He reacts dismissively to this claim, however. For him, 
nihilism is merely a post-Christian condition. Specifically, it is a reaction 
to the realization that no sense can be made of the Christian belief in sal-
vation. “The perception that history is without meaning is threatening 
only to those who inherit from Christianity a need to find meaning in 
history, and this discloses a general truth about nihilism.”17 On this point, 
it is instructive to compare Gray with a further critic of modern liberal-
ism, Leo Strauss. Like Gray, Strauss sees nihilism as part of contempo-
rary life. He argues that it stems from the liberal rejection of natural 
right, which has the result that what is counted as right is socially deter-
mined and therefore relativistic. In turn, this is said to provoke nihilism: 
if we think our convictions amount to nothing more than local prefer-
ence, this means we do not really believe in them.18 For Gray, in contrast, 
nihilism stems not from giving up on natural right but from a reaction to 
Christianity in general, specifically, the special status that it grants to 
human beings. For this reason, their proposals to address nihilism differ 
significantly. Strauss sought to respond to nihilism through a recovery of 
natural right, but, as Gray points out, this is no answer at all. “The diffi-
culty with Strauss’s belief that we can cure nihilism by returning to a 
classical view of things is that he never gives any ground—other than the 
need to escape nihilism—for accepting such a view.”19 Such acceptance 
can only be an act of faith, one that it is impossible to make today: the 
classical view depended upon a teleological account of the natural world 
that has been invalidated by natural science. The correct response to ni-
hilism follows rather from accepting what natural science teaches us 
about ourselves. In particular, it is a matter of coming to fully acknowl-
edge our place as part of the natural world.  
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 Gray hopes to encourage his readers to do just that. He recommends 
that we seek “not to change the world … [but] to see it rightly.”20 If we 
set aside the Christian and post-Christian humanist belief in the inevita-
ble progression of history, we also set aside the issue of nihilism. If we 
come to see things rightly, we do not give ourselves over to nihilism but 
to understanding our proper place in the world: “When we turn away 
from our all-too-human yearnings we turn back to mortal things.”21 In 
politics, this amounts to giving up on utopian projects and accepting hu-
man diversity. As Gray writes, “there are many forms of life in which 
humans can thrive. Among these there are some whose worth cannot be 
compared. Where such ways of life are rivals, there is no one of them 
that is best. People who belong to different ways of life need have no 
disagreement. They may simply be different.”22   
 
 
Post-Enlightenment Liberalism and Value Pluralism  
 
Gray argues that differences on matters of value or ways of life are not a 
contingency that might have been otherwise. Rather, they reflect a fact 
about the world, which he calls value pluralism. In keeping with his in-
sistence on a wholly naturalistic understanding of the world, value plu-
ralism is said to be “a truth about human nature, not the contemporary 
condition.”23  
 Gray’s understanding of value pluralism is developed from the work 
of Isaiah Berlin. Value pluralism contains three elements. First, conflict 
between different values, for example, liberty and equality, cannot be 
rationally resolved by reference to a single overarching standard. Second, 
individual values themselves contain a plurality of interpretations that, 
again, cannot be rationally resolved; in the case of liberty, Berlin points 
out that this concept has at least two understandings. Third, different 
ways of life will generate different values; Gray writes: “The virtues of 
the Homeric epics and of the Sermon on the Mount are irreducibly diver-
gent and conflicting, and they express radically different forms of life. 
There is no Archimedean point of leverage from which they can be 
judged.”24 The first and second elements of value pluralism occur within 
forms of life, whereas the third occurs between them, but the point is the 
same in each case: there is no possibility of a single harmonious settle-
ment of values. Different people and ways of life will value different 
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things, and cannot be criticized for doing so by reference to a uniquely 
rational standard.  
 In Berlin, Gray finds a profound attack on the monism that he takes to 
be central to Western thought. Greek philosophy and Christian theology 
were, Berlin argued, united in holding that all values and goods are ulti-
mately consistent with each other. His insight was to see that this is not 
the case. At the same time, Gray insists that this does not commit either 
of them to relativism or skepticism. Both are in fact cognitivists, “in-
sist[ing] … that values and conflicts of value are matters of knowledge.”25 
Value pluralism is in fact “a species of moral realism, which we shall call 
objective pluralism.”26 
 Despite the similarities between them, Gray goes beyond Berlin in 
applying value pluralism to liberalism itself. Berlin argued that, given the 
irreducible plurality of value, individuals require a protected sphere of 
“negative liberty” to choose among them. Gray argues that this is a mis-
taken inference, and that Berlin ignored his own best insight by falsely 
assuming that negative liberty is the cardinal value. If we take value plu-
ralism seriously, we must recognize that negative liberty itself is not a 
freestanding value existing independently of the judgments of particular 
human beings but is rather the reflection of such judgments. Liberals 
seek to protect individual liberty by a guaranteed sphere of rights, but, as 
Gray points out, “rights claims are never primordial or foundational but 
always conclusionary, provisional results of long chains of reasoning that 
unavoidably invoke contested judgements about human interests and 
well-being.”27  
 For Gray, Enlightenment liberalism fails to recognize the dependency 
of the right on particular views of the good. For this reason, he thinks of 
even Rawlsian political liberalism as a form of Enlightenment liberalism. 
This goes against Rawls’s understanding of his own project. In Political 
Liberalism, Rawls asserts that: “Political liberalism is not a form of 
Enlightenment liberalism, that is, a comprehensive liberal and often 
secular doctrine founded on reason.”28 This is because political liberal-
ism dispenses with the idea of rational foundations and instead regards 
liberal societies as a contingent historical development, bound together 
not by rationality but by feelings of solidarity among citizens who are 
divided on matters of value. Gray is sensitive to Rawls’s attempt both to 
avoid political rationalism and to accommodate pluralism, but neverthe-
less thinks that his project remains a form of the Enlightenment liberal 
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project. Rawls is commended for recognizing that the freedom provided 
by liberal societies will necessarily result in disagreement; he “grasps an 
insight of profound importance when he argues that this deep pluralism 
in modern society is not just a brute historical fact but instead the result 
of unfettered use of human powers in a context of freedom.”29 Yet after 
grasping this point, he is said then to forget it by assuming that underly-
ing such pluralism is widespread agreement on liberal values.  
 Some commentators disagree with this interpretation. Paul Kelly ar-
gues on behalf of Rawls that although he seeks to provide a single 
framework of justice, this nevertheless allows for different settlements 
about the priority of particular rights: “Much of the plausibility of Gray’s 
critique depends upon the claim that liberalism tends towards a single 
unique constitutional form that is valid in all times and all places. That is 
not required, and it is not claimed by any of the main theorists of liberal-
ism.”30 However, this misses the force of Gray’s critique. Kelly is correct 
to say that for Rawls, different local settlements are permissible so long 
as they stay within the limits set out by the principles of justice, but 
Gray’s point is that those principles are themselves undone by value plu-
ralism. The distinction between the right and the good cannot be drawn, 
because the right itself is given content only by a particular view of the 
good. “A strictly political liberalism, which is dependent at no point on 
any view of the good, is an impossibility. The central categories of such 
a liberalism—‘rights’, ‘justice’, and the like—have a content only insofar 
as they express a view of the good.”31  
 As an illustration, Gray contrasts the ways in which different coun-
tries have come to regard freedom of expression.32 Several European 
countries have laws against hate speech, laws that explicitly limit the 
freedom of expression of those who would use racist language. In con-
trast, in the U.S., judges regularly strike down attempts to limit hate 
speech. The difference between European legislatures and the American 
judiciary stems not from a disagreement about whether curbing speech 
limits freedom of expression, because self-evidently it does. Rather, the 
difference turns on judgments about whether such curbs are justified; 
whether it is legitimate to limit free speech for the sake of some other 
value, in this case freedom from hatred and persecution. Such judgments 
are not universal, but reflect particular historical circumstances—in this 
case the importance placed by many in North America on liberty of 
thought and expression compared to understandable concerns about ra-
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cism in parts of Europe in the shadow of the Holocaust.  
 Gray spends some time arguing with particular writers such as Rawls, 
but his concern is ultimately the Enlightenment liberal project in its en-
tirety. That project is said not only to be incapable of accommodating 
value pluralism, but is itself a cause of conflict between different values. 
Although they may concede that a universal liberal polity might never be 
realized, proponents of the liberal project continue to view it as a desir-
able aspiration, one that provides the ideal-type for all ways of life. The 
damaging consequences of this belief in a single regime of rights leads, 
Gray has claimed, to events such as the current Iraq war. This is said to 
be a manifestation of “a new kind of imperialism guided by liberal prin-
ciples of human rights.”33 He also notes the support given by some liber-
als for torture as the means to protect Western societies—societies that 
many regard as at least approximating the ideal universal polity—from 
terrorism.34 
 Gray’s is a damning indictment of liberal thought that claims not just 
to have uncovered internal inconsistencies in the positions of individual 
writers, but to show that liberalism itself is committed to projects that are 
unrealizable. But, as he argues in Straw Dogs, his value-pluralist view 
that tells us that we cannot achieve everything should not be taken as a 
counsel of despair. Different values will conflict—what is required by 
justice might, for instance, conflict with the need for security—but this is 
only pessimistic if we measure it by reference to an unattainable stand-
point such as that promised by the Enlightenment liberal project. 
 This modest and pluralist position is, Gray claims, itself found within 
the liberal tradition. The currently dominant Enlightenment liberal pro-
ject takes liberalism to be the basis for a universal political settlement. 
But he urges us to return to an alternative form, the original “face” of 
liberalism. This face of liberalism aims to derive not a single way of life 
but rather modus vivendi, a peaceful settlement between rivals: 
 
Liberalism has always had two faces. From one side, toleration is the pursuit of an ideal 
form of life. From the other, it is the search for terms of peace among different ways of 
life. In the former view, liberal institutions are seen as applications of universal princi-
ples. In the latter, they are a means to peaceful coexistence. In the first, liberalism is a 
prescription for a universal regime. In the second, it is a project for coexistence that can 
be pursued in many regimes.35  
 
Accordingly, we should renounce both universalistic religion and its 
nominally secular liberal variant and take our task to be the accommoda-
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tion of the pluralism that marks modern societies. Gray argues that rather 
than seeking to specify a single framework valid for all rational people 
and ways of life, we should recognize that different regimes are appro-
priate in different circumstances. We must give up the attempt to trans-




Modus Vivendi as a Transformative Political Project 
 
I want now to argue that, notwithstanding his antihumanist critique of the 
transformative and universalistic elements of Enlightenment liberalism, 
Gray himself can be seen to call for them both in developing his own 
modus vivendi liberal alternative. 
 Although Gray recommends a return to the original face of liberalism, 
he is troubled by the thought that a modus vivendi might be so permissive 
that it treats as legitimate any political settlement no matter how unpleas-
ant. He is very critical of what he regards as the illegitimate elevation by 
liberals of one form of life as the ideal for everyone, something that he 
dismisses as “Western cultural imperialism.”36 Yet he also seeks to as-
sure us that “modus vivendi is far from being the idea that anything 
goes.”37 To be sure, Gray insists that modus vivendi need not be liberal. 
Depending on circumstance, it will sometimes be the case that liberal 
regimes are legitimate, and sometimes nonliberal ones. However, as he 
writes: “modus vivendi articulates a view of the good.”38 That view stems 
from recognition of value pluralism that takes the good to be irreducibly 
plural and accordingly holds that it is diminished by any attempt to re-
duce pluralism. Any legitimate modus vivendi requires that citizens see 
that the good is plural: “It tells us to reject theories which promote a final 
resolution of moral conflicts, since their result in practice can only be to 
diminish the goods that have generated our conflicts.”39  
 It might be objected that to claim that monism diminishes the good 
begs the question of whether there really is such a plurality, rather than—
as, for instance, religious monists would say—a single good surrounded 
by and possibly even endangered by falsehoods. If one takes this monist 
view, then one certainly will not think that the fact that other people at-
tach importance to other values or ends in life is a good reason to tolerate 
or respect them. Gray has a response to this objection, but in making it he 
moves towards the transformative aspect of the liberal project that he 
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strongly opposes. This is, as we have seen, to say that we must come to 
recognize and accept value pluralism as a truth. As he writes, “Conflicts 
arising from the clashing universalist claims of religious fundamentalists 
are founded on errors.”40 Elsewhere he describes those who adhere to 
such beliefs as suffering from “illusions.”41  
 Gray’s project can in this way be seen to be transformative in that it 
requires monists to become value pluralists. Monists must set aside their 
beliefs and come to accept value pluralism, thereby stilling conflict be-
tween competing ways of life: “Internalising the truth of value pluralism 
within a human subject or culture has the effect of dissolving such rival-
ries.”42 However, internalizing the truth of value pluralism can only have 
the effect of dissolving rivalries by transforming the views of the good 
that gave rise to them. The transformation would, moreover, in many 
cases be a considerable one. As John Horton notes, “adherents of a uni-
versal religion very likely would think that their way of life at least 
lacked the value that they thought it had if their belief in a universal re-
ligion was merely illusion.”43  
 In a response to Horton, Gray attempts both to acknowledge the dif-
ference that internalizing value pluralism would make to monotheists’ 
attitudes yet downplay its significance. He writes that the fact that a way 
of life may be based upon an illusion does not render it meaningless; it is 
a mistake to believe “that the value of a way of life depends on its being 
based on true beliefs. Many human lives have been based on illusions 
and many of them have been worthwhile.”44 This misses the force of the 
problem, however, for while it may be true that human beings often de-
rive value from illusions, they do not do so knowingly. Although outside 
observers such as anthropologists might take the view that a way of life 
valued by its adherents is nevertheless based on an illusion, Gray re-
quires that proponents of that way of life themselves recognize its illu-
sory nature. He does not acknowledge what a substantive difference this 
would make to their self-understandings, or how one might find value in 
a way of life that one simultaneously believes to be illusory.45  
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 At certain points Gray shows that he is aware of a tension here, and 
counters it by saying that he does not require that people become value 
pluralists. In Two Faces of Liberalism, he claims that modus vivendi does 
not “aim to convert the world to value pluralism.”46 Yet as we have seen, 
he also thinks that those not converted to value pluralism are suffering 
from an illusion, the remedy for which is to internalize it as a truth. 
Gray’s position here is therefore the bizarre one that people should ac-
cept modus vivendi but not the truth that motivates it in the first place.47 
The tension is seen further in that at other times he is very clear that there 
is a close relation between value pluralism and modus vivendi liberalism. 
In a recent comment he writes: “Modus vivendi rests on the belief that 
value conflict is a natural feature of human life, and for that reason mo-
dus vivendi cannot be decoupled from value pluralism.”48 This latter 
claim is more consistent with his account of the truth of value pluralism, 
but it is made at the cost of accepting that modus vivendi liberalism will 
require the transformation of the (illusory) beliefs of many. 
 Gray’s use of the word “illusion” is significant for understanding his 
project. Illusions contrast with reality, and indicate that he hopes in his 
own writings to identify the way things really are. This aim replicates the 
Enlightenment concern to replace unfounded belief with rationally justi-
fied knowledge.49 In arguing that we give up the illusionary liberal pro-
ject in the name of recognizing the reality of value pluralism, Gray 
moves considerably beyond Hobbes’s concern to cope with the conflict 
that we find in the world by asking us to rationally transform ourselves 
and our understanding of our values. Just as the Enlightenment claims 
knowledge of a single good, value pluralism claims that through the use 
of reason we will see that the good is irreducibly plural. If this transfor-
mation takes place, we will all thereby see that different beliefs each ex-
press a view of the good and are therefore all valid. And as we will now 
see, Gray follows the Enlightenment project further in specifying a uni-
versal standard that he thinks can be used to determine the validity of 
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Pluralism and the Universal Minimum Morality  
 
By requiring that citizens internalize value pluralism, Gray promotes a 
form of the transformative element of the Enlightenment project. But in 
addition, he can be seen to take up the task of the liberal project by speci-
fying universal limits to political authority. He identifies what he calls 
the “universal minimum content of morality,” something that is said to 
be derived from human nature. Distinguishing himself from communi-
tarian writers, he writes that “the claim that there are generically human 
evils does not rest finally on a consensus of belief. It rests on the fact that 
the experiences to which these evils give rise are much the same for all 
human beings, whatever their ethical beliefs may be.”50 These include 
genocide, institutionalized torture, suppression of minorities, the humilia-
tion of citizens, destruction of the environment, religious persecution, 
and the general failure, as Gray puts it, to “meet basic human needs.”51  
 However, if pluralism is as pervasive as he believes—so much so that 
the universalistic liberal project cannot be carried out successfully be-
cause it is unable to accommodate pluralism—it is not possible to iden-
tify a universal standard existing alongside that plurality. Gray’s claim is 
that the universal minimum content of morality and value pluralism are 
consistent because different societies will each grant different values im-
portance but nevertheless share the view that certain practices are ille-
gitimate. However, he cannot make this claim if we take seriously his 
understanding of value pluralism. To recall, value pluralism combines 
three elements: that conflict between different values cannot be rationally 
resolved by reference to a single overarching standard; that individual 
values themselves contain a plurality of interpretations that cannot be 
rationally resolved; and that different ways of life will generate different 
values. The second element in particular conflicts with the idea of a uni-
versal minimum morality. In the case of religious persecution, Gray sets 
his face against most liberals by thinking that restrictions on religious 
liberty are sometimes justified. Noting that “[i]n Singapore there is full 
freedom of religious practice and belief, but proselytism is forbidden,” he 
comments that this is a legitimate means to create peaceful coexistence 
in that country.52 However, some would say that such restrictions amount 
to a form of discrimination, because a central tenet of their faith is being 
denied them. In the case of humiliation, although we may agree that it is 
generally undesirable, what one person experiences as humiliating may 
be different from that of another.  
 This indeterminacy regarding universal evils is seen also in Gray’s 
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claim for the existence of universal virtues. He writes that prudence, 
sympathy and courage are universal, but once we unpack what we mean 
by these terms we may find that we mean very different things by them; 
for example, what one person takes to be sympathy might, to someone 
else, be a matter of cowardliness. This is a point that Gray has himself 
made against liberal values such as autonomy: “What shows up as per-
sonal autonomy in liberal morality may be disobedience or selfishness 
from the standpoint of traditional values.”53 However, this objection ap-
plies to all values. In making his case for universal virtues, Gray ac-
knowledges that this “does not mean it is always easy to distinguish be-
tween different interpretations of a universal human virtue and the differ-
ent virtues of particular cultures.”54 This suggestion, made in the text in 
parentheses, indicates that he is aware that there is a difficulty when it 
comes to identifying universal virtues, but he seems to believe that it 
does not impact upon his thesis that such things exist. However, if we 
take value pluralism as seriously as he wishes, there is good reason to 
think that it does.  
 This point can be developed by comparing Gray to another critic of 
liberalism, Stanley Fish. In Fish’s characterization, the liberal project is 
“the fashioning of a form of government that assures order and stability 
without installing in a position of privilege and political mastery any of 
the views held by a diverse citizenry.”55 Fish argues that the liberal pro-
ject is disabled by the absence of a perspective that is not implicated in 
any particular value or way of life. Its premise guarantees that the liberal 
project cannot successfully be carried through, for if it is animated by the 
recognition that disagreement is endemic and intractable, the failure to 
reach agreement on matters of justice follows necessarily as a matter of 
simple logic.  
 Fish’s objections to the liberal project are very similar to those of 
Gray. However, he presses his case against liberalism in a way that helps 
illustrate how far Gray is himself open to the objection that he universal-
izes his own view of the good and turns it into a political project. In the 
case of political liberalism, Fish identifies several forms of purported 
common ground, showing in each case how it contains a particular sub-
stantive value. One of these is procedural rules, which are said to regu-
late conflicting views without themselves expressing such a view. Fish 
shows how procedures are inescapably substantive, both when it comes 
to deciding which to employ, and in interpreting how they are to be ap-
plied to particular cases. The appeals liberals make to supposedly value-
                                                 
 53Ibid., p. 56. 
 54Ibid., p. 38. 
 55Stanley Fish, The Trouble with Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), p. 175. 




free notions such as fairness, neutrality, impartiality, or reasonableness, 
are in fact appeals to formulas that contain their own particular value 
judgments and views of the good.  
 Gray of course rejects the idea that procedures can stand outside of 
culture and history, and delights in pointing out the way in which sup-
posedly neutral principles—for example, freedom of speech—always 
turn out to reflect particular values and circumstances (this gives rise to 
questions such as whether to limit hate speech). However, Fish identifies 
two further forms of supposedly common ground, to both of which Gray 
is committed. The first is a general standard (“Be good,” “Don’t be 
cruel”) that supposedly stands free of particular disagreements. Fish ar-
gues that the problem with such a standard is that it is either couched at 
such a high level of generality that it is useless in helping to address 
those disagreements, or it is given substantive and thus controversial 
content. The second form of common ground is the supposedly universal 
distaste for certain views. Here, Fish objects that “views supposedly re-
jected by everyone will always have supporters who must then be elimi-
nated or declared insane so that the common ground will appear to be 
really common.”56 Gray’s claim that certain things are universal evils, 
and that some values constitute part of any decent life, combine these 
points. In a point directed at political liberals such as Rawls but which I 
take to apply equally to Gray, Fish notes that: “if the absence of common 
ground … initiates a search for a form of government that will accom-
modate diversity, you cannot begin the search by identifying a common 
ground the absence of which motivates the search in the first place.”57  
 
 
Between Enlightenment Liberalism and Moral Relativism  
 
I have no quarrel with Gray’s account of goods and evils, only with his 
claim that they are not the reflection of particular interests and values but 
possess universal validity. In maintaining that they do, he does exactly 
what he takes supporters of the Enlightenment liberal project to do: as-
sert that his own beliefs have the status of universal values while dis-
missing those who think differently. Despite his claims to discard the two 
elements of that project—the universalistic and the transformative—he 
can be seen to advocate them both in his own account of modus vivendi 
liberalism. 
 Why, though, should Gray, a staunch opponent of the Enlightenment 
project and its political manifestation in liberal theory, come to propose a 
project that is itself both transformative and universalistic? Here we can 
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return to Strauss. Gray differs from Strauss in that although they both 
take nihilism to be increasingly a part of modern life, for Gray it is 
merely an overreaction to the Christian and humanist belief that history 
is a story of inevitable human progress. For him the cause of and solution 
to both utopianism and nihilism is the same, namely, to see things rightly 
by recognizing and accepting our animal condition. But although Gray is 
untroubled by nihilism, he shares Strauss’s concern with relativism. This 
leads him not simply to see but to propose a more active response.  
 Gray understands relativism as the view that our moral outlooks are 
culturally independent of each other and as precluding any understanding 
or criticism from the outside: “that our moral outlooks are embodied in 
different world-views. Accordingly, we cannot reason about them. Rather, 
each of us is trapped in one of them.”58 Such a view would preclude him 
from arguing that certain practices, such as torture, are objectively 
wrong. He is thus very dismissive of those, such as Richard Rorty, whom 
he takes to be relativists.  
 Gray’s concern with relativism can, I think, be seen if we compare 
how we might expect him to respond to a certain kind of objection with 
how he does in fact respond. George Crowder has written that for Gray, 
when faced with a choice between values, “we can only decide by refer-
ence to our own arbitrary preferences or by some procedure elected at 
random.”59 Gray could quite legitimately respond to Crowder that the 
fact that values cannot be compared in overall value does not lead to this 
undesirable situation. That our reasons for holding one value rather than 
another are not ones that every person must accept does not reduce them 
to mere preferences, for we will have reasons for them that we think are 
important or answer to our particular situation. Similarly, any procedure 
we use to decide between values will itself be a reflection of what is 
taken to be important rather than a reflection of an “Archimedean point,” 
but this does not make that procedure random. We will have reasons for 
thinking it superior to alternatives, even though we recognize that other 
people and societies who value different things may adopt a different 
procedure. By trivializing the complex historical considerations that give 
rise to ways of life as merely “arbitrary” or “random,” Crowder makes 
precisely the move to which Gray objects in Enlightenment liberalism, 
that of downplaying the diversity of human life in favor of a supposedly 
rational universalism.  
 It is striking, however, that Gray does not think this response suffi-
cient. He is clear that: “Any standpoint we adopt is that of a particular 
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form of life and of the historic practices that constitute it.”60 But at the 
same time, he proposes a standpoint that is said to be universal. He 
thinks that the universal minimum means that he can criticize world-
views and moralities from the outside without committing himself to the 
Enlightenment project that prescribes a single way of life. The problem, 
however, is that this response comes at a cost, namely, it conflicts with 
value pluralism.  
 A concern with relativism can, I think, also be seen to underlie a sub-
tle but important change in Gray’s understanding of what is entailed by 
value pluralism itself. In his books Enlightenment’s Wake and Berlin, he 
followed Joseph Raz in holding that some values are incommensurable, 
by which he meant that they cannot be compared. Some writers have 
found this understanding of incommensurability problematic. To claim 
that two values cannot be compared seems to require that we recognize 
them to be values, and the very fact that we are able to do so suggests 
that they are in fact commensurable. To say that incommensurability de-
nies the possibility of comparison is, therefore, it has been claimed, self-
refuting.61 Gray does not explain why, but he came to qualify his view by 
acknowledging that incommensurability does not rule out the comparison 
of different values.62 He no longer asserts that values cannot be com-
pared, but rather argues that there is no single scale that we are required 
to use when making comparisons: values “can be compared endlessly—
but they cannot be compared with one another in overall value.”63 In 
making this amendment, however, Gray goes on to say that they can be 
compared in overall value to the extent that certain values are said to fall 
short of the universal minimum.  
 That is to say, Gray’s concern to avoid relativism drives him back to 
the transformative and universalistic elements that he himself objects to 
when they feature as part of the liberal project. Sometimes the tension 
between his two concerns—his rejection of utopianism and his concern 
to avoid relativism—appears within a single passage. For example, in 
Two Faces of Liberalism, he writes that: “The case for modus vivendi is 
not that it is some kind of transcendent value that all ways of life are 
bound to honour. It is that all or nearly all ways of life have interests that 
make peaceful coexistence worth pursuing.”64 If we accept the claim 
made in the first sentence and disavow any transcendent value to which 
all citizens must adhere, then this might appear to commit us to moral 
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relativism. To avoid this, the next sentence introduces the claim that 
there are interests that “all or nearly all” ways of life share, something 
that is for all practical purposes indistinguishable from a nonrelative 
transcendent value of the kind that Enlightenment liberal theory seeks. 
Gray’s closeness to Enlightenment liberalism in substance if not in name 
is also evident when he writes: “The aim of Modus vivendi cannot be to 
still the conflict of values. It is to reconcile individuals and ways of life 
honouring conflicting values to a life in common. We do not need com-
mon values in order to live together in peace. We need common institu-
tions in which many forms of life can coexist.”65 If the word “liberalism” 
were substituted for “modus vivendi” in this passage, this would stand as 
an accurate summary of political liberalism.66 
 That Gray revises modus vivendi into a version of the liberal project is 
particularly striking given that there is reason for thinking the original 
Hobbesian form would suit his needs. The complaint that many writers 
level against a modus vivendi is that it is not a principled political settle-
ment, but a relativistic accommodation to contingent circumstances. This 
concern, central to Rawls’s attempt to distinguish a modus vivendi from 
an overlapping consensus, has been summed up by Kelly, who speaks of 
it leaving people to “the vagaries of political compromise, in which the 
most powerful group will always be able to dictate the terms.”67 Al-
though Kelly writes this as a warning of a danger to be avoided, the 
situation he describes is inescapable. Much of the force of his objection 
is a function of the manner in which it is presented: the language of “va-
garies” and of brute power dictating terms is clearly not dispassionate, 
and disguises the fact that things are often far more benign than this. 
Compromises need not lead to these unfortunate consequences, and in-
deed are often granted by the majority.68 And if successful, a modus 
vivendi is likely to lead to a more stable settlement than critics such as 
Kelly allow because, as Horton has suggested, citizens are led to support 
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This paper has sought to examine what I have presented as Gray’s inabil-
ity to move away from liberalism and utopian political projects. Gray 
makes some telling criticisms of the Enlightenment liberal attempt to 
transform traditional forms of morality by subjecting them to critical rea-
son in order to achieve a universal liberal regime. In its place he recom-
mends that we accept naturalism, something that precludes perfectionism 
and entails accepting the irreducible diversity of human life. Yet for all 
his criticisms of humanism and its political manifestation in Enlighten-
ment liberalism, Gray seems, however reluctantly, to be committed to a 
project that is in substance the same. His concern with the prospect of a 
“mere” modus vivendi and anxiety to avoid moral relativism drives him 
to claim that value pluralism places constraints on any legitimate politi-
cal settlement, and in specifying those limits he proposes his own version 
of the transformative and universalist projects. Value pluralism, a doc-
trine that Gray invoked in order to accommodate the diversity that we 
find in the world around us, is transformed into a project that limits it. I 
suggest that his inability to move away from Enlightenment liberalism 
suggests that the attempt to formulate a genuinely accommodationist lib-
eralism is bound to fail. If one is really convinced that one should aim 
“simply to see,” this precludes making claims for positions such as a 
universal minimal morality. If on the other hand one wishes to do more 
and to prescribe limits to any legitimate political settlement, then one’s 
position is inevitably substantive, arranged from some particular view-
point and thus likely to be experienced as illegitimate from some other.70 
 
Michael Bacon 
Department of Politics and International Relations 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Michael.Bacon@rhul.ac.uk 
                                                 
 70I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. My thanks also go to Paul Kelly, Rodney Barker, and John 
Angliss. The paper was written with the generous support of the Leverhulme Trust. 
